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Commentary
Punishing the Crime of Forgetting
Emily V. Shaw ∗ and Elizabeth F. Loftus
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(e.g., Leins & Charman, 2016). Many memories are not storedUniversity of Californ
Although many people think that forgetting is a problem
n life, and it often is, they would do well to appreciate the
enefits of forgetting. Fawcett and Hulbert (2020) have mar-
haled a powerful argument for the adaptive value of forgetting,
ighlighting the many ways that forgetting is both a common
nd essential feature of cognition. Their arguments have impli-
ations for memory as it plays out in real life, but here we
ocus on implications in the legal realm. We make two major
oints. First, within the legal system, forgetting on the part
f criminal defendants can transcend mere embarrassment or
nconvenience, and can actually implicate defendants in crimi-
al acts. Second, forgetting in relation to trauma and victimhood
an be complicated and controversial, with some victims pre-
erring to retain their painful memories, even at a personal
ost.
Defendant  Alibis:  When  Forgetting  is  a Crime
Fawcett and Hulbert (2020) aptly rebuke the notion of for-
etting as nothing more than a cognitive “sin,” but the notion of
orgetting as bad or blameworthy thrives in the legal system. The
ourts frequently rely on the sworn testimony of witnesses, who
ledge to relay information accurately—“the truth, the whole
ruth, and nothing but the truth.” In this domain, accurate mem-
ry can be the difference between compensation or liability,
reedom or captivity, and even life or death.
One particularly challenging memory-related task within
he legal system is providing an alibi. When people are con-
idered potential suspects in a crime, they may be asked to
ccount for their whereabouts at the time of the crime. For
nnocent suspects, this task may require them to recall mun-
ane details from an earlier time—sometimes days, weeks, or
onths prior. Inaccuracies that are later discovered have been
sed against suspects, with suggestions that they were deliber-
tely lying.
Author Note.
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It is hard to overstate how challenging the task of providing
 flawless alibi can be for the average person. Multiple research
tudies have examined memory in this setting and found that
nnocent people struggle to give accurate, consistent alibis. In
ne study, participants were asked to describe their location and
ctivities during a specific afternoon three weeks prior (Strange,
ysart, & Loftus, 2015). Participants were then asked to come
ack a week later, repeat their “alibi,” and provide support-
ng evidence for their account. Nearly half were inconsistent
etween their first and second account; many were completely
nable to provide any supporting evidence at all. Another study
f alibi accuracy found that, when given two days to check
heir own alibi, 36% of participants had to amend their initial
ccounts, changing factual details or adjusting the supporting
vidence (Olson & Charman, 2012). These studies show that on-
he-spot recollections about one’s whereabouts at a specific time
n the past—in other words, providing an accurate alibi—can be
iddled with error.
But why is it hard for many people to provide accurate ali-
is the first time? Fawcett and Hulbert (2020) provide a helpful
xplanation through their discussion of the “Clarity” virtue of
orgetting. The argument goes like this: When an activity is
ather ordinary, like biking to work each day, it is not partic-
larly useful to remember in detail. Unless something occurs
o prompt memory retention, it may be most efficient for the
emory to be effectively erased (Davis & Zhong, 2017, cited
ithin Fawcett & Hulbert, 2020). In the context of alibi recol-
ection, if the activity that a person is called to account for is
rdinary, it may be more likely to be forgotten and subsequently
isreported. Moreover, the task of alibi reporting is made even
ore difficult by the nature of the prompt that produces the alibi∗ Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Emily Shaw,
niversity of California, Irvine, United States. Contact: evshaw@uci.edu.
n ways specific to a particular date or time, but this is often
hat investigators are seeking an account of when they request
n alibi.
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Unfortunately, the tendency for people to incorrectly recount
heir own past activities, while harmless in ordinary life, can
e disastrous for suspects who need to provide alibis. A famous
xample of the devastating impact of an inconsistent alibi comes
s case of Ronald Cotton. In 1984, Mr. Cotton was accused
f breaking into the home of Jennifer Thompson and raping
er. When asked by investigators to provide an alibi, Mr. Cot-
on first claimed he had been with friends at the time of the
rime, but later changed his story after realizing that he had
ixed up his weekends and had actually been with his mother
Thompson-Cannino, Cotton, & Torneo, 2009). Investigators
ere suspicious of this inconsistency and ultimately charged
r. Cotton with rape. He was convicted in 1985 and served
0 years in prison before he was exonerated through DNA evi-
ence.
An inconsistent alibi is often a red flag to investigators, who
re trained to see such inconsistencies as evidence of lying or
uilt (see Inbau, Reid, Buckley, & Jayne, 2013). This perception
f deception may lead to confirmation bias or “tunnel vision” in
hich investigators focus primarily on gathering incriminating
vidence on one particular suspect and fail to adequately inves-
igate or consider other disconfirming evidence (see Crozier,
trange, & Loftus, 2017), with the potential to lead to a criminal
harge of an innocent defendant.
If defendants with inconsistent alibis plead not guilty, they
ace conviction from a jury, as jurors themselves are also
ikely to be suspicious of inconsistencies. Studies have found
hat people often (incorrectly) believe that motivation increases
emory accuracy—such that a person in a high-stakes situ-
tion is less likely to forget important details (e.g., Kassam,
ilbert, Swencionis, & Wilson, 2009). People also tend to
elieve that accurate alibis are consistent over time (Burke,
urtle, & Olson, 2007) and are distrusting of alibis that change,
ven when the change includes details that would logically
trengthen the alibi (Culhane & Hosch, 2012). Inconsisten-
ies in an alibi can lead jurors to infer that the defendant is
ying. For example, in one study, more than 88% of participants
greed that a defendant who changes his or her story follow-
ng a police interview is “probably lying” (Culhane, Hosch, &
ehn, 2008). This distrust in inconsistent alibis, and tendency
o see malicious intent rather than simple forgetting, can pose
 risk to defendants who are unable to consistently account for
heir whereabouts at the time of a crime due to simple forget-
ing.
Obviously, there are times when a suspect who claims to have
orgotten a detail is lying and times when an alibi is inconsis-
ent because it was manufactured to cover a crime. However,
hen investigators and jurors presume that this is always or
ften the case, they underestimate the ease of forgetting and can
ut factually innocent defendants at risk.
Victim  Accounts:  Choosing  (Not)  to  Forget
Another context within the legal system where memory is
rucial is in the recollections of victims. Victims of crimes
re often called to testify in cases that go to trial and asked
o recount their memories of being harmed. In criminal cases,
c
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hese memories can be traumatic and painful, both to remember
nd to present in public for cross-examination and judg-
ent.
In some cases, victims may be healthier and happier if
hey were able to forget their trauma (as Fawcett & Hulbert,
020, illustrate), especially if seeking justice is not at issue
i.e., already achieved or impossible to obtain). However, peo-
le can be resistant to the notion of forgetting traumatic
emories. There are several ways in which people prioritize
etrieving or preserving memories of traumatic events (real or
magined) over the suffering that having such memories may
reate.
Forgetting  Versus  Repression
Fawcett and Hulbert (2020) explains how one benefit of
orgetting is the ability to recover from negative experiences.
orgetting can serve a “Guardian” role, mercifully allowing
s distance from unpleasant memories of our past and provid-
ng relief from re-experiencing pain. The authors describe the
ase of Jill Price, a woman with exceptional autobiographical
emory (Parker, Cahill, & McGaugh, 2006, cited by Fawcett &
ulbert, 2020) who is unable to forget her negative emotional
xperiences. Ms. Price is forever at the mercy of the retrieval
ues in her environment, always living with the possibility that
 passing cue will trigger a vivid memory she may wish to
void.
What would become of people like Ms. Price if something
orrific happened to them—if they were the victim of a violent
rime as adults or children? Are there any processes in human
emory—beyond ordinary forgetting—that can help one move
ast a traumatic event? This question goes to the heart of a
ecades-old debate in the field of memory research: Is it possible
or memories of trauma to be “repressed” (i.e., stored without
onscious awareness and unreachable through typical retrieval
ues), but then effortfully retrieved at a later date?
Whether or not traumatic memories can genuinely be
epressed and later recovered has been a hotly contested sub-
ect in the field of memory research, especially since the 1990s
Patihis, Ho, Tingen, Lilienfeld, & Loftus, 2014). Some clin-
cians in direct contact with patients have long insisted that
epression of traumatic memories is possible (e.g., Blume,
990), especially in cases of severe physical or sexual abuse
xperienced in childhood. In this understanding, “repression”
oes beyond ordinary forgetting or distraction from a painful
ast experience. The repressed experience is stored in memory,
ut is challenging to access and resistant to obvious retrieval
ues (e.g., “Were you ever physically harmed by a parent?”
nswer: “No.”). According to the repression notion, despite
eing inaccessible to the patient, the memory or the knowl-
dge it reveals can poison the patient’s daily life, and recovering
his toxic memory is an option that may help the patient
eal.However, academic memory researchers argue that this con-
ept of repression is devoid of credible scientific support. Clearly
raumatic memories can be forgotten with time, and of course an
dult reflecting on childhood memories may be able to recognize
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ast experiences as abusive and wrong in a way they could not as
 child. But academics argue that massive repression in the clini-
al sense is unsupported by empirical studies, and the collection
f studies that claim to demonstrate repression (e.g., Briere &
onte, 1993; Herman & Schatzow, 1987; Scheflin & Brown,
996) have serious errors or limitations (see Piper, 1997; Pope
 Hudson, 1995).
Instead, many researchers say that the memories of trauma
hat are “recovered” through suggestive psychotherapy can be
ntirely new creations or fabrications. Evidence for this claim
omes from a variety of research studies in which researchers
ere able to implant false memories in participants, even for
tressful childhood events. In one of the most famous exam-
les, researchers led participants to falsely believe that as a
hild, they were lost in a shopping mall (Loftus & Pickrell,
995). Other upsetting false memories implanted by researchers
nclude committing a crime as a young person (Shaw & Porter,
015) or being attacked by a vicious animal (Porter, Yuille,
 Lehman, 1999). These studies demonstrate the malleabil-
ty of memory and show that even memories of untrue but
psetting experiences can be implanted in unwitting individ-
als.
After decades of debate about the status of repressed memo-
ies in the 1990s, a consensus was reached among academic
emory researchers, who concluded that the existence of
epressed memories is unsupported by empirical evidence. But
hile many memory researchers considered this issue settled,
here have been recent signs of a resurgence in the debate.
elief in repressed memory—or “dissociative amnesia” within
ome clinical circles—may be undergoing a revival and gaining
opularity among legal agents and clinical psychologists alike
Otgaar et al., 2019), despite the absence of any compelling new
vidence for the phenomenon.
Unfortunately, the belief in repressed memory has conse-
uences that extend beyond the therapeutic context. The 1980s
nd 1990s saw dozens of high-profile cases involving allega-
ions of abuse based on recovered memories, only to later be
ebunked. For example, in 1988, Paul Ingram was accused by
is children of a variety of acts of satanic ritual abuse and sexual
buse, including impregnating one of his daughters and giving
er an STD; however, a physician who examined the daughter
etermined that this was not medically possible (see Herzog,
019). Mr. Ingram spent over a decade in prison before his
elease in 2003.
While the practice of recovering memories may be therapeu-
ic for some patients, these “recollections” need to be treated
ith caution. By seeking to uncover repressed memories and
ngaging in risky practices linked to false memory creation,
isguided clinicians may lead their patients to “remember”
orrific events that never actually occurred and create new
nd real trauma for the patient and the wrongly accused
like. False “recovered” memories have torn apart families,
uined reputations, and led to imprisonment for numerous inno-
ent defendants. It is therefore valuable for clinicians, legal
gents, and members of the public to have a rich understand-
ng, not just of the way forgetting does  occur (through work
ike Fawcett & Hulbert, 2020), but also of the ways it does
l
t
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ot—dispelling damaging notions of forgetting like the myth
f repression.
Dampening  Traumatic  Memories
The “Serenity” virtue of forgetting, as described by Fawcett
nd Hulbert (2020) illustrates how forgetting can help people
vercome the burdens of negative memories and enable people
o forgive transgressions. Notably, these benefits can occur with
r without conscious intent on the part of the person experienc-
ng troubling memories. But what if a person seeking to forget
id not need to actively seek distraction, or wait passively for
orgetting to occur, but could instead willfully choose to delete
 traumatic experience from memory?
This possibility is not (total) science fiction. Medical
esearchers have been testing drugs such as propranolol which
ave the potential to dramatically reduce the formation of trau-
atic, emotionally-charged long-term memories (and PTSD)
hen consumed close to the time of a stressful event (Brunet
t al., 2008; Pitman et al., 2002; see also Kolber, 2006,
008). Such drugs may eventually become a regular part of
ost-trauma medical care, and their potential applications for
educing memory of trauma are fascinating and controver-
ial.
Advocates of the use of memory-dampening drugs assert that
his is a method of reducing human suffering and an option that
ictims deserve to have available to them. However, critics argue
hat victims of crime may have a duty to hold on to these memo-
ies for the sake of justice; successful prosecution of perpetrators
ould be made difficult if victims chose to forget criminal acts
ommitted against them (see Kolber, 2008), potentially leaving
hose perpetrators free to harm others.
Interestingly, the limited research that has been done on per-
eptions of these memory-dampening drugs suggests that the
ublic is reluctant to consider using them. For example, one
tudy by Newman, Berkowitz, Nelson, Garry, and Loftus (2011)
rovided Americans and New Zealanders with a series of hypo-
hetical scenarios where a memory-dampening drug could be
sed. Participants were asked to imagine they were either a
estaurant manager or a soldier on a peace-keeping mission
nd were the victim of a violent assault. Overwhelmingly, a
arge majority of participants in both countries and across all
cenarios indicated they would not want to take the memory-
ampening drug. This was true even when participants were
arned that they had a 40% chance of developing PTSD, and
t was true even for participants who reported past experience
ith traumatic events. In fact, participants who reported past
raumatic experiences were significantly less  likely to want
he drug then those who did not report prior traumatic expe-
iences.
This study suggests that victims may be unwilling to dampen
heir own traumatic memories when given the opportunity to do
o, even when warned there is a sizable risk of lasting psycho-
ogical harm (i.e., developing PTSD). When given the choice
o forget a trauma, extending and deliberately controlling the
Guardian” role of forgetting through drugs, it appears many
eople would prefer not to forget.
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Conclusion
Despite the clear “virtues” of forgetting presented by Fawcett
nd Hulbert (2020), the legal world has not caught on, often
arshly judging defendants who forget details about the past.
ome in the therapy community have also overlooked the value
f forgetting, coaxing patients to remember traumatic experi-
nces that may not have actually occurred. This is not to say that
ictims of traumatic events should just forget their true experi-
nces of suffering. For many, that is not possible, and for some,
orgetting comes at the expense of justice. But we should be
areful not to put “remembering” on a pedestal. Forgetting ordi-
ary details should not be such a strong mark of suspicion for
uspects, and it should it not be seen as the enemy of healing in
linical contexts.
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